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Strategic Invisible Waves: A Review on Electronic Warfare 
 Prior to the 20th century, any army that was sufficiently big enough and 
organized well enough would be able to lay siege to a certain territory; they could 
defeat the rival army if their size and sheer strength was enough to overwhelm 
others. This war strategy began changing in the 20th century as many nations, 
military commanders, and strategists started to realize the importance of fighter 
planes and missiles as offensive systems in winning the war (Van Niekerk & 
Maharaj, 2009; Potenziani, 2006). It quickly became evident that in order to win 
any war, it was essential to have air superiority; this concept became especially 
important with the start of the Cold War, when air defense became a cold, hard 
reality. Naturally, as technology progressed, both sides increased their air defense 
capabilities and many systems were developed as a result. As NATO allies invested 
significantly more time and money on developing aircrafts, the Soviets gave more 
importance to their air defense as well.  
Some of the defense systems developed are notable, such as the United 
States’ Patriot missile defense system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system. Both are mobile surface-to-air and anti-ballistic missile systems 
meant to intercept and destroy missiles carrying chemical warheads and cluster 
bombs. THAAD even has the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles at particular 
altitudes to minimize damage to the surrounding target area. Similarly, the Soviet 
Union developed a complete series of surface-to-air and anti-ballistic missile 
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systems (Adamy, 2001); the most recent of which is the S–500 Triumph. The main 
advantages of the S–series is that it is a mobile system that can be positioned in 
different regions and locations. Other countries also developed air defense systems, 
such as Israel’s “Iron Dome” system that was specifically designed to intercept low 
flying targets.  
All of these air defense systems were created primarily to deny opponents 
air dominance, and all have a similar type of concept that uses radar to identify and 
destroy the target by launching surface to air missiles (SAM). The types of radars 
and SAM used varies, but the fundamental concept is the same. Through increased 
research and inventions, the use of state-of-the-art technologies has increased many 
fold. Today’s battlefield has evolved from simple hand-to-hand fight to a 
complicated network of communication such as global positioning systems to reach 
the specified location in all weather conditions either through air, sea, or land 
(Poisel, 2002).  
Even for ground operations, the solder must know the exact location where 
he has to land and how to coordinate his operation to communicate with colleagues 
and higher ranks. Imagine what could happen in a situation if suddenly all 
electronic communication and other electronic devices stop responding? It would 
be similar to a person suddenly losing all of his communication skills, incapable of 
speaking, seeing, and hearing; this is electronic warfare. This relatively new form 
of offensive warfare plays with electromagnetic spectrum/waves (Ryan, 2007). 
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Although electronic warfare came into use in the early 20th century, many countries 
have more recently developed an interest in using radiated electromagnetic energy 
for electronic warfare. This article will analyze the importance of electronic warfare 
in its existing capacities and in the future battlefield. 
Electronic Warfare (EW) 
 Since the inception of radio communication, electronic communication has 
dynamically transformed the armed forces. From soldiers identifying their positions 
and locating targets to navigating aircraft and launching missiles, daily operations 
depend on electronic waves. Technology has evolved to the point that it is nearly 
impossible to conduct an operation effectively without these electronic eyes and 
ears. Both routine and special operational functions are negatively affected by any 
disturbance to these electronic waves (Shinar & Turetsky, 2002), so research and 
development continues to more effectively protect these electronic waves, maintain 
advantage over adversaries, and to enforce the doctrine of area denial. Destroying 
an army’s coordination by disrupting their communication network and—
combined with a quick or preemptive response—will result in the failure of their 
mission (Spezio, 2002). Disrupting an army’s telecommunication network during 
the American civil war meant intercepting telegrams; during World War I 
telephones were used to communicate with commanders and troops; with the 
advent of the two-way radio used in World War II, research and development 
focused on using the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for both defensive and 
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offensive purposes. This new dimension of warfare is called Electronic Warfare 
(EW). 
Since the introduction of battlefield radios, electronic warfare has been a 
component of modern conflict, but it has progressed far beyond jamming radios. 
Electronic warfare systems now sense, exploit, and manipulate the electromagnetic 
spectrum (EMS). EW is developing as a priority and a focus for development as a 
relatively affordable and easily implemented means of disrupting the working of an 
enemy's radar and other systems, as well as defending one’s own equivalent 
systems from interference. With so much modern technology reliant on the 
electromagnetic spectrum, the battle for electronic overmatch is waged on the 
airwaves all the time. In modern warfare military personnel heavily rely on the 
EMS for navigation, positioning, communications, and other capabilities; EW 
ensures those capabilities for allies and denies them to adversaries (Vesti 2017). 
EW has become an increasingly spoken word in the defense community, though it 
is not always well understood. Its goal is to prevent an opponent from acquiring 
control of and an advantage in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum while allowing 
friendly and unrestricted access to oneself and allies (Poisel, 2002; Shinar, 2002). 
With the expansion of the military and operational capabilities of systems 
that have EMS, the relevance of electronic warfare systems has increased in order 
to provide security. This system, which is very effective at using autonomous 
weapons in general and providing vision, intelligence, and management support to 
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active elements in the field, is also very reliable and effective at using tactics like 
information transfer, deception, signal cutting, signal strangling, and target surprise 
on enemy electromagnetic fields. Infrared, Radio Frequency, Electromagnetic 
Deception, Radio and GNSS Jamming, Anti-Jamming and Deception, Electronic 
Masking, Reconnaissance and Intelligence, Eavesdropping, Electronic 
Reprogramming, Emission Control, and other methods and technologies are used 
in electronic warfare (Choi et al., 2020). 
An Overview of Electronic Warfare 
The EW system performs three operational functions on electromagnetic 
waves/spectrum through command and control: attack, support, and protection 
(Figure 1). 
Electronic Attack (EA) 
This part of the system functions in offensive mode by either nondestructive (soft 
kill) or destructive (hard kill). It tries to control the enemy’s electromagnetic 
spectrum by launching attacks on the opponent and disrupting, denying, destroying, 
or deceiving their electronics infrastructure. It can be carried out by jamming, 
spoofing, or sending powerful Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) on the opponent’s 
electronic communication systems. Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) are sudden 
bursts of very high-power electromagnetic impulses. This kind of sudden burst has 
the capacity to damage electronic components in its vicinity and can also inflict 
damage to physical objects and humans.
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Electronic Protection (EP) 
Electronic protection basically consists of counter measures to protect military 
facilities, personnel, and communication channels from any form of electronic 
attacks. It’s similar to electronic defense or shield or insulation from electronic 
attack. If facilities are not properly protected, electronic attacks can have 
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devastating effects on the functioning of the military. Spread spectrum technologies 
are a widely used method of Electronic Defense. Other examples of Electronic 
Defense are the use of restricted frequency, stealth technology, and emission 
control. EP methods are intended to eradicate, decrease, or lessen the effects of 
unintended/unwanted EM signals. These characteristics and processes work 
together to keep friendly capabilities operational. The Modular Electromagnetic 
Spectrum Deception Suite (MEDS) would be capable of simulating the emissions 
produced by army units of various sizes. This means that an adversary would spend 
time researching it or avoid the area altogether; it would also make noise to hide 
valid messages (Frater & Ryan, 2001). 
Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
 ES supports tasks such as surveillance and reconnaissance of the electronic 
spectrum. ES is the side of warfare that gathers information (geolocation, 
frequency, modulation type, copy of communication signals, device type, etc.) 
about an enemy by intercepting radiated energy. For rapid response, stand-alone 
systems are mainly used. By installing data link equipment for electronic 
information transmission, a standalone radar warning receiver (RWR) system that 
performs simple self-defense and threat alert can be extended to detect and identify 
remote dangers (Kjellén, 2018). 
Modern fighter planes and surveillance ships, such as the Aegis class, 
employ an integrated system that pool resources from all EW and electronic 
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systems. Unfriendly emitters are detected continuously from all directions using 
radiofrequency and electro-optical receivers installed around the perimeter of the 
airframe. All sensors are combined by a central computer and shown on the pilot’s 
helmet visor. The system also combines data from off-board sensors to create a 
complete picture of the electrical environment in the area (Wade, 2019). 
The military uses electronic warfare to take advantage of an adversary’s 
electromagnetic emissions; they can block or jam communication or spectrum, 
causing communications and navigation to be disrupted (GPS). They can also 
intercept and decode messages to learn about an adversary’s plans. Electronic 
warfare is typically silent and undetectable, yet it has the potential to cause 
significant harm to the adversary. Any military can wreak havoc by causing a loss 
or disruption in communication, with the most serious consequence being an 
inability to communicate with other parts of the force. Because every piece of 
equipment and machine includes electronics and communicates through EM waves, 
electronic warfare can take place on land, sea, and in the air 
Obtaining EW supremacy is critical to attaining key objectives such as air 
superiority, area denial, and dominance in the war. Without it, an enemy might 
disrupt and degrade navigation systems on precision guided munitions (PGMs), 
causing missiles to deviate from their intended route and suppressing a country’s 
air defense systems (Poisel, 2002; Frater & Ryan, 2001). 
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Countries and Electronic Warfare 
 The United States is the largest user of electronic warfare systems and paid 
more attention to this subject through having large EW operational based systems, 
using electronic warfare systems from the sea, air, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
land. Unmanned aerial vehicles were used initially for the purpose of observation 
and surveillance and has since demonstrated UAVs capabilities in EW. High 
altitude and long endurance surveillance help gather large volumes of data and 
keeps eyes and ears on the adversaries. The CREW Duke EW system has been used 
for a long time to jam remotely operated roadside IEDs. Now it has upgraded 
AN/MLQ-44A PROPHET SGINT Vetronics EW vehicles to AN/MLQ-44Ba 
vehicle that could provide electronic surveillance as well as locate and suppress 
enemy communications and networks. It also provides near real time digital 
information to the army (Lee et al., 2020). 
A huge network of EW and counter EW Suites are being used in aircrafts 
such as the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-18 and in some other dedicated aircrafts including 
theEC-37 and EC-128. The Boeing EA-18G Growler is a modified version of F/-
18F Super Hornet and operates from aircraft carriers. This aircraft is designed for 
EW attack and counter measures. The United States also uses high altitude and long 
endurance drones like RQ-4 Global Hawk to collect real time data. 
The AN/ALQ-218,ALQ-99,AN/ASQ-239, and NGJ electronic warfare and 
countermeasure systems are used in the EA-18G Growler, the F-22, and the F-35. 
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The AN/ALQ-250 Eagle passive active warning survivability system (EPAWSS) 
provides radar warning and situational awareness; this helps combat the air defense 
systems, allowing the fighter to achieve deeper penetration into an enemy’s 
territory. The AN/ASQ-239 system produced by BAE is one of the most advanced, 
fully integrated electronic warfare and 360-degree situational awareness as well as 
quick response capabilities. LAN/ALQ- 254(V)1 Viper Shield EW system will 
provide a virtual electronic shield to the aircraft(F-16). Its AGEIS class combat 
system in ships provides electronic surveillance and counter measures in the sea. 
The AN/SLQ-32 is currently functioning as a primary electronic warfare system in 
use by U.S. Navy ships. A newly developed system, the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP 
Block III, is more dynamic than existing one and will provide cutting-edge 
electronic attack capability. It will allow groups of ships to better work together to 
defeat threats electronically. While the United States’ early contributions to and 
interest in the development of EW systems waned after the cold war era, this past 
decade has seen a resurge of interest, and the USA returned to research and 
development in EW (Potenziani, 2006; Ryan, 2007; Frater, 2001). 
Even though Russia was successful in disrupting Japanese radio 
communications during the Russian-Japan war, it failed to suppress Georgia’s air 
defense systems during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. Several Russian planes 
were lost as a result of this situation. Learning the value of EW, Russia has invested 
in EW and has made significant advancements in its EW capabilities over its 
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competitors. Since 2009 Russia has continually engaged in EW modernization, 
with upgraded EW systems entering service at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels to supplement the capabilities of all branches and arms of the 
military. In recent years, Moscow has made significant progress in purchasing and 
developing EW capacity across its Armed Forces branches and service arms. 
Objectives for the Il-22PP Porubshchik EW aircraft include its ability to silence 
any radio transmissions, air defense radars, early warning aircraft, air command 
posts, and ground communication centers. It disrupts the radio traffic of tactical and 
strategic aircraft, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and reconnaissance 
(Spezio, 2002; McDermott, 2017). 
The Krasukha-4 EW ground complex blocks GPS transmissions within 
a300-kilometer radius. The communication channels used to transfer information 
have no barriers to jamming. Not only will the technology on this future platform 
have to efficiently jam AWACS aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, air 
defense systems, ground equipment, and signals from the enemy’s satellite 
grouping, it will also have to jam signals from the enemy’s satellite grouping. 
The Russian Krasukha-2 system can analyze signal kinds and then jam an 
adversary’s radar. The capacity of Russia to spoof signals is a unique characteristic 
of Krasukha-2. When an actor imitates, or “spoofs,” authentic Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) signals in order to alter positioning, navigation, and 
timing (PNT) data, this is referred to as spoofing. Spoofing is generally done by 
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providing fake positional information to an attacker. Russia intentionally emits the 
identical signals on GNSS frequencies to prevent receivers from locking on to the 
genuine GNSS signals (Kjellén, 2018). 
Borisoglebsk-2 is best known for its participation in eastern Ukraine, where 
it is said to have hampered the use of Ukrainian drones by blocking incoming GPS 
signals. The nerve center for Russia’s air defense and other electronic 
countermeasure systems is Moskva-1. This system continuously monitors 
electronic emissions over a 400-kilometer radius on all frequency ranges, acquiring 
electronic intelligence and performing jamming and electronic suppression as 
needed. The Baikal-1ME automated system is interoperable with EW unit systems, 
which are highly mobile and difficult to track down. The psychological and cyber 
operations capabilities used against Ukrainian government forces, which includes 
gaining access to soldiers’ communication systems, tries to demoralize and weaken 
troops’ morale (McDermott, 2021). 
Despite the fact that the United States continues to have a military edge in 
conventional weaponry, Moscow today has a crucial asymmetrical advantage that 
attempts to close the gap. There have been several reports of Russian EW assaults 
in Syria that have either interfered with communications or falsified GPS signals 
from other providers in the area. According to a statement made by U.S. Special 
Operations Commander General Raymond Thomas in August 2018, Russia, which 
used electronic warfare systems primarily through signal cutters in the Syrian field, 
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has frequently disrupted communication between troops in operations carried out 
using U.S. warplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles. According to a statement made 
by U.S. Special Operations Commander General Raymond Thomas in August 
2018, Russia used electronic warfare systems in Syria, primarily signal cutters, to 
frequently disrupt communication between troops in operations carried out using 
U.S. warplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles (Vardhan & Garg, 2014). In addition 
to the United States and Russia, Israel, China, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and India have also considerably developed their expertise in EW techniques. 
The Growing Importance of Electronic Warfare 
 To execute military operations, modern militaries rely on communications 
equipment that employs a wide range of frequencies. As a result, contemporary 
forces use electronic warfare to try to control the spectrum. The higher the role of 
electronic warfare in conflict, the more advanced a military foe is considered. For 
the past few decades, interest in EW technology has been limited to a few practical 
applications. Because of the reliance of worldwide armies on electromagnetic 
spectrums, it has now emerged as one of the most promising areas for defense 
research and development. This domain has developed as a critical one for having 
the ability to have superiority and advantage over the enemies. The increased use 
of low-cost drones and loitering munitions by both state and non-state actors has 
prompted countries to conduct active studies in this area. In the long term, utilizing 
EW against these low-cost drones and loitering munitions will be less expensive 
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than using a high-cost air defense system. Because current air defense systems do 
not provide a foolproof shield, EW can be used in conjunction with them (air defense 
systems) to close the gaps. Without firing a single shot, EW allows users to engage 
in “non-contact operations” that jam, blind, disrupt, and demoralize an enemy 
(Frater & Ryan, 2001). 
EW is a source of concern for Russia and the United States since critical 
objectives such as attaining air superiority rely heavily on achieving EW 
supremacy. Without it, an adversary can disrupt and degrade the navigation systems 
on precision guided munitions (PGMs), causing missiles to deviate from their 
intended route, as well as jam a country’s air defense systems. 
Target Saturation Concept 
 Using newly emerged drone swarm technology and simultaneously 
launching huge quantity of missiles/shells toward targets will ultimately create 
fatigue in any type of air defense system currently under use and leads to fail. In 
several previous incidents, it has been noted that the advanced air defense systems 
were unable to engage and neutralize the incoming hostile projectiles with100% 
effectively. In recent conflicts, low-cost drones have effectively evaded these 
highly technical and complicated air defense systems. Even with high tech radars, 
multiple target engaging, and quick responding systems there is a limitation in 
maximum targets engagement, reloading time, and cost effectiveness. In addition, 
using smaller, multiple, and low flying drones make modern air defense systems 
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less effective in defending their assets. This disadvantage of target saturation can 
be overcome by using the combinations of projectile/kinetic energy-based air 
defense systems and Electronic Warfare systems. Russia successfully handled these 
types of threats in Syria using a combination of Pantsir mobile air defense and the 
EW system to neutralize a majority of drone attacks on their Khmeimim air base. 
Since most of the drones are guided by GPS and all of them contain electronic 
circuits, they can be either jammed or spoofed through EW. A combination of 
conventional air defense with EW will work more effectively. 
Global Market 
 In the last decade, more and more countries have recognized the importance 
of EW and have begun to engage in research and development. As per the report 
published by Allied Market Research, the global electronic warfare market 
generated $15.81 billion in 2020, and is estimated to reach $23.56 billion by 
2028, growing at a CAGR of 5.6% from 2021 to 2028 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE). 
Significant technological improvements and the integration of electronics into 
military equipment are leading to a trend toward multilayered defense systems, 
which is projected to drive the electronic warfare market over the next several 
years. The increased use of UAV systems, as well as the necessity for ground 
surveillance and communication jamming, all serve as potential for the electronic 
warfare sector. 
 
STRATEGIC INVISIBLE WAVES: A REVIEW ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE 16 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on history, we can deduce that the army with superior weaponry and 
tactics has always had the upper hand in battle. Since the introduction of electronic 
technology into the battlefield, its use has increased manifold, and it has become an 
indispensable part of army operations. Even under the current scenario, we can say 
that conducting operations without these electronics is impossible. To avert an 
unfavorable scenario and to maintain their competitive advantage over adversaries, 
countries started working on—and continually improve—electronic warfare. 
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